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AN IMPARTIAL REVIEW OF TWO PAMPHLETS, &c.

(Price One Shilling.)

AN

IMPARTIAL REVIEW

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AN IMPARTIAL REVIEW OF

Two PAMPHLETS lately publiſhed,

ONE INTITULED,

An APOLOGY for a late RESIGNATION:

THE OTHER,

The RESIGNATION Diſcuſſed, &c.

IN WHICH

The real INTENTION of both Authors are clearly expoſed, and the real Importance of that memorable Event, in reſpect to the preſent Syſtem at Home and Abroad, is truly ſtated.

Tacitæ magis et occultæ Inimicitiæ timendæ ſunt, quam indictæ et apertæ.

Cic. Act. VII. in Verr.

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AN

IMPARTIAL REVIEW, &c.

IT muſt certainly afford the higheſt Pleaſure to all true Lovers of Freedom, when they behold all Parties, in their Turn, putting in their Claim to that invaluable Privilege the Liberty of the Preſs. To this the Patriot has recourſe, when he is charged with factious Deſigns, with foſtering Sedition, or countenancing Diſaffection. To this the diſcarded or reſigning Miniſter flies for Relief, when he can no longer bear the Court Climate, or endure the Drudgery of being a Clerk in his Office. To this even Miniſters condeſcend to apply, when they find that the Elevation of their Station will not protect them from Cenſure, and that in the midſt of Power, of Wealth, and of Titles, they are as much the Sport of Fortune, and of vulgar Tongues, as other Men. A clear, a conciſe Demonſtration this, that of all the Benefits enjoyed by a free People,

there is none ſo great in itſelf, ſo wide in its Extent, or ſo important in its Conſequences, as the Liberty of the Preſs. By it we have the Power of arraigning bad Meaſures, and of defending the Right of enquiring into the State of the Nation, and of the Conduct of thoſe who rule us; of detecting falſe Patriots, and of manifeſting to the World, the Worth of thoſe who are truly ſuch; who are content to ſerve the Publick without Places; who are content alſo, when it becomes neceſſary, to ſerve in them, and are equally content to reſign Places, when by keeping them they can ſerve their Country no longer. All theſe juſt and laudable Purpoſes are moſt effectually promoted by the Liberty of the Preſs; nor is there much to be feared from its Abuſe, for the Remedy ſo ſoon follows the Injury, that, unleſs we could ſuppoſe all the Parts of the Nation to lie on one Side, and all the Probity on the other, which is an abſurd and impoſſible Thing, there can be no great Hurt done. An Anſwer is as ſoon wrote as a Libel, and the Publick are ſuch equitable Judges, that if a Man's Pride does not induce him to deſert his Cauſe, or his Paſſion diſable him from defending it, he is ſure that Right will be done.

We

We have daily Inſtances of the Truth of all that has been advanced, and therefore it would be needleſs to go about to prove it; but if that were neceſſary to be done, a better Proof could hardly be met with, than the Tranſaction which is to be now the Subject of my Pen. A Man diſtinguiſhed by every thing that can juſtly merit the Name of Diſtinction, by Birth, by Title, by Parts, by Learning, by Wit, by Politeneſs, and by the higheſt Pretences to publick Spirit, after making a Figure in Courts, in Senates, in Negotiations, in adminiſtring the Government of a great Kingdom, in holding one of the firſt Poſts in the Miniſtry, thinks proper to retire from Buſineſs, and to exchange for the Pleaſures of Privacy and Retirement, the Fatigues of a publick Office, and the Load of miniſterial Care; that he muſt have his Reaſon for this is out of doubt; every prudent Man, even in private Life, takes no Step of any Conſequence but from proper Motives; and the more important the Meaſure is, the ſtronger and more cogent muſt thoſe Motives be. In the ſuperior Sphere of Action, without queſtion the Caſe is the ſame; for we cannot ſuppoſe that Men of Abilities, ſufficient to be intruſted with the high Secrets of State, the Rule of Kingdoms, and

the Concern of Nations, act with leſs Caution, or behave with a ſlighter Degree of Circumſpection than the meaner Rank of People in the ordinary Occurrences of Life. We cannot without doing them the higheſt Injury conceive that they are led by Paſſions, governed by Whim, or become the Dupes of Indolence and the Spleen. It is for this Cauſe that whenever a Matter of this Nature falls out, Converſation is thereby engroſſed, and every Tongue enquires whence it aroſe? what were its Cauſes? how it came about? and ſome, perhaps, go ſo far as to demand what its Conſequences will be? If theſe People have no Anſwers given them they will deviſe Cauſes, divine Reaſons, and gueſs at the *Court-Secret* 'till they either are, or think themſelves right.

There wants not ſome who look upon the firſt of the Performances which I have undertaken to examine in this Light; that is, they believe the Author meant to give his own Conjectures to the World as this noble Perſon's Motives; others take the Thing in a quite different View: They believe him, if not dependent upon this great Man, at leaſt an humble Friend and Retainer of his; one that had an Opportunity of hearing little Stories, and an

Art

Art of piecing together private Intelligence, which, in their Judgment, produc'd this Pamphlet: But he who undertook to anſwer it places the Affair in quite another Light; he will needs have it a *falſe* Apology, under Colour of which is introduced a *real* Indictment; he allows all the Sincerity of the Malice againſt thoſe who are ſtill great Men; but he is for explaining away that Attachment which the firſt Writer affects, for the great Perſon he pretends to defend. Whether this Gentleman be right or wrong in his Notion of the Author he undertakes to anſwer, without all Doubt he has ſet him upon that Foot which was faireſt for his Purpoſe, and may therefore juſtly claim the Character of being a *Maſter* of his *Trade* as well as he. I ſhall take the Liberty of examining pretty cloſely the Colour which each of them has given to his Story; but as I have the Benefit of the *Britiſh* Nation in View, and that only as I undertake to ſift this Meaſure no farther than as it may be uſeful in this Reſpect; ſo it is abſolutely requiſite for me not to ſet out at the ſame Period of Time with theſe Writers, but to take Things a little higher, that the Reader may have an Opportunity of enlarging his Proſpect, take a Variety of Things into his View that are of infinitely greater

Conſequence

Conſequence than many of thoſe petty and perſonal Altercations, about which theſe Writers have ſpent, or rather waſted their Time. This RESIGNATION is certainly a Point of Moment to the People of *Great Britain*, and as ſuch ought to be treated with Seriouſneſs and Dignity; or, at leaſt, this is the Light in which I conſider, and the Manner in which I propoſe to treat it.

If we except a few of the firſt Years before the Government was thoroughly ſettled, there exiſted during the laſt and preſent Reign, to the Time of the breaking out of the preſent War, but two general Syſtems. The firſt was that of taking the Lead in *Europe*, laying Plans, and wide ones too of Empire and Government, and directing at the ſame Time the particular Frame of Things in this Iſland, and in a great Meaſure the general Scheme of Affairs through all that Part of the World with which, conſidered in a political Light, we have any Concern. It cannot be denied, even by ſuch as diſapprove that Syſtem, that it had much of Grandeur and not a little of Beauty; we were the Arbiters of the North; our Fleets rode triumphant in the *Baltick*; we made a Kind of War with *Sweden*; and we certainly made a Peace for that Crown, which, if not beneficial,

neficial, was at leaſt expedient. We ſettled the Proportion of Power which might naturally induce us to think we held the Balance in the *North*, and thus much is within the Reach of our Memories; that nothing could ſtir there but we took our Part in it; and the Diſputes of *Ruſſia*, of *Poland*, *Sweden* and *Denmark*, were in thoſe Days as much our Care, as afterwards the Jars in *Lower Saxony*, and the Controverſies of the *German* Princes. We were buſy alſo in the *South*; our Fleets humbled the Pride of *Spain*, ſecured one Kingdom, and reſtored another to the Houſe of *Auſtria*. In ſhort, the Succeſſors of the Earl of *Oxford*, I mean in Power, had the good Luck to experience the Wiſdom of his Plan, and the Truth of the Maxim that he laid down, *that it would execute itſelf*. They actually divided the Intereſts of the Houſe of *Bourbon*, and brought *France* to join with the Houſe of *Auſtria* in defeating the Projects of *Spain*. Such were the Merits of that Syſtem, and ſuch the Conſequences of the Quadruple Alliance. But whatever Succeſs we had abroad, we were far enough from being contented at Home; the Execution of great Schemes is naturally attended with great Expence, and with other Difficulties alſo. Thoſe who diſliked this Syſtem mag-

nified theſe in their Speeches and Writings, and the diſaſtrous Turn of the *South-Sea* Scheme ſo totally derang'd our domeſtic Adminiſtration, that an Alteration of Miniſters, and conſequently of Meaſures, could not be avoided; and this I take to be a pretty true Hiſtory, or rather Repreſentation of the political State of *Great Britain* to the Cloſe of the Year 1720, taking in however no greater Space than that of four Years at the moſt.

Upon the Ruins of this, which I have already deſcribed, was built another, and a very different Syſtem. It was thought to ſtand on a narrower Bottom, and yet allowing the Caſe to be ſo, the Grounds of it were ſo well laid, that it ſeemed to reſt upon a firmer Foundation, and actually ſubſiſted for twenty Years. A Space ſo large, that I doubt whether the Records of our Hiſtory can ſhow its equal, at leaſt under the Guidance and Direction of a ſingle Perſon, one who derived his Favour from his Power; whereas all former Miniſters ſtood indebted for their Power to their Sovereign's Favour. The Maxims of this new Syſtem lay either ſo deep as ſcarce to be diſcovered, or were otherwiſe of ſo variable a Nature, that they could ſcarce with any Propriety be ſo called.

It

It has been ſtiled a Syſtem of Expedients, and 'till ſome better Appellation is found out, one may allow this to be a pretty right Name. For with reſpect to foreign Affairs, there was no ſettled Plan, except that of taking any Meaſures that might keep off a War; and in this Point of View, if it was not a great and glorious, it was at leaſt a ſafe and trimming Syſtem. We did not affect to ſpread all our Sails, or to go before the Wind; we contented ourſelves with a ſlow and gentle Motion, and were exempt from Storms and Tempeſts, tho' we might feel a little of Sea-ſickneſs. At home Influence ſupplied the Place of Authority, and ſuch timely Changes were made in the Adminiſtration, that notwithſtanding it was compoſed from Time to Time of different Members, a few great Ones only excepted, its Appearance was pretty much the ſame. Some Difficulties indeed there were; but theſe were eluded for the preſent, and left, often too with good Succeſs, to be overcome by Time.

The very Structure of this Syſtem made it alike obnoxious to Men of extenſive Parts and of reſtleſs Spirits; the former deſpiſed, and the latter could not bear it. There was no Room in ſuch an Adminiſtration for

Men of Enterprize ; Propoſals for making things better were but coldly received ; but any Advice to keep them as they were was readily embraced. Such as loved to be in Action found themſelves out of their Element, and having no Chance for Employment in the State, were compelled in a Manner to fall in with the Oppoſition. This, by Degrees, made thoſe formidable who were at firſt inconſiderable ; the Cloud that was but like a Man's Hand began at length to darken the Horizon, and the Sound was heard of Abundance of Rain. A Syſtem of Expedients can never be without Defects ; and when theſe come to be expoſed by Men of quick Wits and volatile Abilities, they are ſoon ſhewn in ſuch Lights as cannot be eaſily born. This, by Degrees, became the Caſe here, and tho' the calm and prudent Author of this pacific Adminiſtration had the Fortune, as rare as it was good, to be equally dear to two Princes ; yet Time and Chance, that on many Occaſions had been his beſt Friends, failed him now and then, when his Antagoniſts preſſed him ſo cloſely, that tho' his Dependants defended him with a Steadineſs which himſelf could hardly expect ; yet, in a Courſe of Years, great Breaches were made ; and in the End a very trifling Incident, as a very ſmall Weight, when the

the Balance is even, turned the Scale. That very kind of Craft, which had been ſo long his Support, became his Ruin and his Downfal; was brought on by that very Influence which had raiſed him, of which no Man knew the Force ſo well, or had better inſtructed others by his Example, to employ and urge it againſt himſelf.

We may now lay aſide that figurative Language which political Rhethoric has taught us, and which is never ſo neceſſary or ſo uſeful, as in ſuch Deſcriptions as theſe, which, according to the common Conſtruction of Words, would require whole Volumes to diſcuſs; but by the Help of this metaphorical and expreſſive Diction, a few Paragraphs may contain and convey the Idea better than ordinary Language could have done in its utmoſt Extent. But when we are to ſpeak of Matters of Fact, and thoſe Matters of Fact of ſuch a Nature, as to affect great Characters and Subjects of high Importance to this Nation; it is neceſſary to uſe the plaineſt Words, and the moſt ſimple Stile imaginable, at leaſt, for one who writes fairly and honeſtly, not with a View to ſcreen one Man, or recommend another. All the World knows that the laſt capital Act of the late great Mi-

niſter was the CONVENTION with SPAIN, concluded and ratified in *January* 1739: The Deſign of that Step was to make a ſtrong and ultimate Effort to ſupport the pacifick Syſtem; and tho' it ſeemed to be ſupported by an Addreſs of the Houſe of Lords, which was agreed to after a warm Debate, on the 1ſt of March following; yet it was ſupported in *form* only, and not in *effect*, tho' the Number were *ninety-five* againſt *ſeventy-four*. Whoever remembers the great Speaker upon that Occaſion, cannot but remember alſo that the noble Perſon, who diſtinguiſhed himſelf moſt in expoſing the Folly of ſhowing a Diſpoſition to preſerve Peace at any Rate; in magnifying the Indignities offered to the *Britiſh* Nation by the Crown of *Spain*, and the Impoſſibility of trading with that People, till full Satisfaction was obtained; as alſo the Impoſſibility of hoping for Redreſs by any other than vigorous Meaſures; will allow, that if he equalled *Demoſthenes* in his *Oratory*, he equalled him alſo in his apparent Fondneſs for *War*, in his high Contempt of *Expedients*, and in his generous Concern, that the *Glory* of an ancient and free People ſhould not be ſacrificed to the *private Conveniency* of thoſe who were *in Power*, and their *Friends*. Whoever conſults the

the Proteſts ſigned upon the Houſe's agreeing to the Addreſs, will find a certain Name there, and will alſo find, that thoſe who ſubſcribed that Proteſt, conſidered the Convention exactly in the ſame Light in which I have placed it; that is to ſay, as the laſt Meaſure of a ſinking Adminiſtration, the ultimate Effort of the Friends to the *pacifick Syſtem*, which they meant to condemn and render odious, by proteſting againſt that Addreſs. This had its Effect at home and abroad; in ſhort it produced firſt *Repriſals* upon, and then a *War* with *Spain*, by which the Syſtem was demoliſhed; tho' the Author of it kept his Ground a little longer, but kept it with Difficulty, purſued with the ſame Clamour, and hunted by the ſame Perſons after the Change of the Syſtem as before, on pretence that he was *inſincere*; and that tho' his *Actions* were *martial*, his *Intentions* were ſtill as *pacifick* as ever.

In the ſucceeding year 1740, there were many Things of Importance that occurred, and which fully ſhewed the Senſe of the wiſeſt and greateſt Men in the Nation, with reſpect to the State of publick Affairs, and the Management of them; but as I deſire to be ſhort, I will take notice only of *two* Things.

Things. The *firſt* is a Diſpute that happened upon the Motion for an Addreſs, which was occaſioned by the K—— making uſe of the Words *Heats and Animoſities*, in the laſt Paragraph of his Sp—ch from the Throne; it was ſaid by thoſe who oppoſed the M——r, that thoſe Heats and Animoſities were occaſioned ſolely by his pertinaciouſly perſiſting in bearing the Injuries and Inſults offered to this Nation by *Spain*, and a very great Streſs was laid upon ſaying any thing in the Addreſs, that might intimate there was ſo much as a *Party* in the Kingdom againſt the War with that Crown, which was poſitively aſſerted to be a *falſe Fact*; and if this was true, then the *Britiſh* Nation was unanimous in their Aſſent to the War with *Spain*. The *other* Inſtance I ſhall mention was the Addreſs upon Admiral *Vernon*'s Succeſs in taking *Porto Bello*, in which theſe Words were made uſe of. " It affords the moſt reaſonable Hopes and " Expectations that, by the Bleſſing of " God upon your Majeſty's Councils and " Arms, it may be attended with other " important Advantages, and highly con- " tribute to the obtaining *real* and effec- " tual Security of thoſe juſt Rights of Na- " vigation and Commerce belonging to " your Majeſty's Subjects, for the Preſerva-

" tion of which your Majeſty entered into " this neceſſary War." An Objection was made to the Word printed above in *Italics*, upon a Suppoſition that it had the ſame Meaning as that which is coupled with it; but the Earl of *Abington* obſerving, that *Gibraltar* and *Port Mahon* affording us *real* Security for the Freedom of our Trade and Navigation in the *Mediterranean*, and that it was become neceſſary we ſhould have the ſame ſort of Security, for the Freedom of our Trade and Navigation in the *American* Seas, the Objection was given up. Thus then it is clear, that the Nation have a Right to ſuppoſe the Unanimity of the K——'s great Council, in the Approbation of *three* Points: *Firſt*, That the War with *Spain* was *neceſſary*: *Secondly*, That *Gibraltar* and *Port Mahon* are a *real* Security for our Trade and Navigation in the *Mediterranean*. *Thirdly*, That our Trade and Navigation in *America* can only be rendred *ſafe* by our obtaining a *real* Security of the ſame Kind *there*.

In 1741, the moſt memorable publick Tranſaction was the Motion for removing the *Great Author* of the pacific Syſtem from his M——y's Preſence and Councils, and the Deſign of this was publickly declared

clared to be the condemning in a parliamentary Manner that Syſtem, which for ſo many Years he had ſupported and maintained. It is very true, that this Motion miſcarried both in the Houſe of Lords and in the Houſe of Commons; but from the Proteſt upon rejecting that Motion in the former, we have a clear and inconteſtable Proof of the Sentiments of thoſe who ſigned it, in reference to that Syſtem, which they condemned, and the oppoſite Syſtem, which they meant to ſubſtitute in its place; for the Emperor *Charles* VI. being now dead, there was an abſolute Neceſſity of *Great-Britain*'s declaring either her Adherence to her old Syſtem, or her Reſolution to ſet up and carry to the utmoſt of her Power into Execution a new one. One Paragraph of this Proteſt will be fully ſufficient for our Purpoſe, and demonſtrate beyond the Power of Contradiction, what was the Syſtem *cenſured*; and by taking the contrary Meaſures from thoſe therein condemned, and ranging them in proper Order, what was the Syſtem *approved*. This Paragraph then run thus, " Becauſe " we apprehend that by the Conduct of " Sir *R. W.* in relation to foreign Affairs, " during the Courſe of his Adminiſtration, " the Balance of Power in *Europe* has been " deſtroyed,

" deſtroyed, the Houſe of *Bourbon* has " been aggrandized in many Inſtances, " particularly by the Addition of *Lorrain*; " the Houſe of *Auſtria* has been depreſſed " by the Loſs of Part of the Dutchy of " *Milan*, and the whole Kingdom of *Na-* " *ples* and *Sicily*; and if ſuch a Change in " the Syſtem of *Europe*, occaſioned by the " Miſconduct of any Miniſter whatſoever, " would be criminal, we cannot think it " *the leſs* ſo, in *one* who joined in the Pro- " ſecution of the Authors of the Treaty of " *Utrecht*, upon the particular Charge of " having reduced the Houſe of *Auſtria* " too low, and left the Houſe of *Bourbon* " too powerful." There is one obvious Remark that can eſcape no Man, who reads this Paragraph with proper Attention, and with any reaſonable Proportion of Judgement; which is this, that if it was fit and juſt to ſtamp ſuch a Mark of Ignominy on a Man who could abet and ſupport a Syſtem ſo agreeable to the Treaty of *Utrecht*, the Author of which he had purſued and proſecuted with the utmoſt Activity, it can never be right or reaſonable to allow any Man's Conduct to be either honeſt or laudable, who, after *approving* this *Cenſure* for *this* Reaſon, ſhould notwithſtanding be for concluding this War, by making a Peace

upon the *ſame Terms*, or *worſe* than thoſe of the long decried Treaty of *Utrecht*.

In the Year 1742, upon the Meeting of the new Parliament, it very ſoon appeared that the Power of the *old Miniſter* was in its Wane; and that, as his Syſtem was demoliſhed two Years before, and very narrowly eſcaped a parliamentary Condemnation the laſt Year; ſo it was impoſſible he ſhould any longer retain the Shadow of his former Authority, or the Poſt of which he had been ſo long poſſeſſed. Upon his Removal another noble Perſon, characteriſed in the Apology by the Title of the *common Enemy*, came into the Direction of Affairs with the Aſſent, as it was underſtood, of the old Miniſter, and with very loud, if not general Acclamations from the People. We are not told by the *Apologiſt* what Sort of Man this new Miniſter was; unleſs being equally hated by thoſe who *took* him *in*, and thoſe who did not *go in* with him, and, being wild and drunk, may paſs for a Character. Indeed what appears to me the ſtrongeſt Proof that the noble Perſon apologized for could have no Hand in directing or approving that Piece, is the great Improbability that *one* Man of *Quality* ſhould give *ſuch* a Character of *another*. The Writer of

of the *Reſignation diſcuſs'd* ſtept out of his Way to do this Lord Honour, and to ſpeak of him in much milder Terms, and with much greater Deference for his Abilities, tho' he very fairly avows that his Schemes were impracticable. I cannot take upon me to be a Judge of this; but it may be of ſome Uſe to the Reader if I obſerve, that this very ſame great Man had been in Power before, and had a great Share in promoting the *firſt* Syſtem, of which I have already given an Account, and was by Degrees excluded from his Share in the Adminiſtration for his known Diſlike to the *ſecond* Syſtem. It was very natural therefore to expect that, upon his being placed at the Helm, he would reſume his *former Syſtem*, as he really did; and it is for this Reaſon that I avoid calling it a third Syſtem, to prevent Perplexity and Confuſion. In order to carry his Schemes into Execution, he went over with the late Field-Marſhal, Earl of *Stair*, to *Holland*, returned ſoon after, and in a very ſhort Space of Time went thither again a ſecond Time. It is allowed that he found the *Dutch* very cautious, uneaſy, and irreſolute; and whoever conſiders the Nature of *his* Syſtem, and of *our* Government, will find it no very difficult Matter to account for this Diſpoſi-

tion of theirs, without having Recourſe either to *French* Influence, or to *French* Money. The Riſk they were to run in embracing their Share of his Syſtem was very great, and their Danger immediate; no Wonder therefore that they were not haſty in cloſing with his Propoſals, for they might naturally apprehend that, as his Syſtem had been before exploded, *after* a *ſhort Trial* it might *be ſo* again; and it is very apparent, that if they did think ſo they were not much miſtaken.

In the next Year there was not only an open and avowed Oppoſition formed againſt this Miniſter's Syſtem, but it was alſo carried to a very great Height, as all the World muſt remember; for in this Year commenced the great Controverſy about the *Hanover* Troops. A Controverſy of a very ſingular Nature, as will fully appear to the Reader at this Juncture, if he will pleaſe to recollect one Circumſtance that happened before it, and ſeveral others that have happened ſince. When the War with *Spain* was once declared, a War with *France* was ſoon apprehended, and the Grounds of this Apprehenſion appeared ſo rational, that Notice was taken of them in Addreſſes to the Throne, and Aſſurances given to his M——

of

of the moſt dutiful and affectionate Support from his Subjects, if by the Proſecution of *one* War the *other* became neceſſary. But theſe Apprehenſions growing ſtronger, and withal a Demand being made by the Queen of *Hungary*, for that Aſſiſtance from us to which ſhe ſtood intitled from Treaties, the *old Miniſter* then in Power thought it reaſonable to augment the Army; but this was violently oppoſed for two Reaſons: Firſt, Becauſe the War with *Spain* did not require any Augmentation of our Forces: And ſecondly, Becauſe the beſt Way to aſſiſt the Queen of *Hungary* was by hiring foreign Troops for her Service. Yet, when the *Hanoverian* Troops were for that very Purpoſe taken into our Service, this was condemned as an unjuſt and impolitic Meaſure; and it was ſaid that we might have hired other Troops cheaper. It has been ſince found expedient to hire Troops at a higher Rate, and it has been alſo found no eaſy Matter to get them even at that Rate, or, in Truth, at any Rate at all. Whatever might therefore be thought in thoſe Days of Clamour and Diſcontent, moſt certainly if ſuch a Syſtem as an Oppoſition to that lately overturned, was laid down in the Proteſt againſt Sir *R. W.* was to be ſupported and maintained; this was not only a very expedient,

expedient, but a very neceſſary Meaſure; and yet the declaring it ſuch was as ſtrongly controverted and as obſtinately oppoſed in the moſt auguſt Aſſembly of this Kingdom, as any Thing ever was that came under Debate there. The great *Miniſter*, who in the *Apology* is ſtiled the *Common Enemy*, did not loſe his Spirits upon this, or reſolve to abandon the Plan he formed. On the contrary, he went forward and puſhed his Schemes with great Vigilance and Vigour; and notwithſtanding all that is ſaid of the Coldneſs and Backwardneſs of the *D——h* by us, at this Juncture, and eſpecially by the *Apologiſt* throughout his whole Pamphlet, yet they are at this very Inſtant *ſuffering* for not being ſo cold and backward as it is ſaid by us they were. To prove this I muſt refer my Readers to the Reply lately publiſhed by the FRENCH Court to the Anſwer given to the States-General to their Memorials, in which it is expreſsly affirmed, that the Republic went *fully* into the *ſanguine Schemes* againſt *France*, diveſted herſelf thereby of her Quality of Auxiliary, became a principal Party in the War, and thereby juſtly expoſed herſelf to be treated in ſuch a Manner as ſhe has been, and is ſtill treated by the moſt Chriſtian K—. I cannot tell how to reconcile this

Fact

Fact either to the heavy Charges brought againſt the late M—r for going ſuch Lengths without the Concurrence of the *D——h*, or to the indecent Reflections made upon that whole Nation throughout the whole *Apology*. But it is hoped that whenever an *authentic* Account of the *Reſignation* appears, which is now become neceſſary, and it is ſaid cannot long be with-held, we ſhall ſee this Matter ſet in its true Light by the *Hand* in the World *moſt* capable of ſuch a Performance.

By Degrees the Objections raiſed againſt the received Syſtem appeared ſo ſtrong, and the Oppoſition againſt the Miniſter, who was looked upon as the *Patron* of that *Scheme*, became ſo very formidable, that many of his Collegues in the Adminiſtration began to ſee plainly there was no ſuch Thing as keeping the Machine in Motion, or, in ſhort, of carrying on the public Affairs without removing various Incumbrances. It was their Senſe of this that produced the Treaty for a Coalition, or the *Broad-Bottom Treaty*, as the *Apologiſt* calls it, with which his Performance commences. The Author of the *Reſignation diſcuſſed* complains, that the Writer before-mentioned did not previouſly ſet forth the *Principles*

of thoſe who were *taken in* by that Treaty, and I cannot ſee why his Reader ſhould not complain of him for the very ſame Fault. But I can eaſily ſee what was his Motive; he acted wholly upon the Defenſive, and therefore would not ſtir a Foot from the Poſt he meant to maintain. This Point however is now cleared up, and the Reader has ſeen that Part of thoſe who acted ſo warmly, and ſo effectually in overturning the pacific Syſtem, grew very ſoon diſpleaſed with that Syſtem, which it was ſuppoſed they would have readily embraced, and thereby rendered it impoſſible for that Part of the *old* Miniſtry, which had for ſome Time adopted the revived Syſtem, to proceed upon the Plan that had been laid down for its Execution; and it was from the Concurrence of theſe Diſpoſitions on one Side or the other that the Right Honourable the Earl of *Granville* reſigned the Seals, as Secretary of State; which was publiſhed in the *London Gazette* of *Saturday November* the 24th, 1744, and by that Reſignation made Way for carrying the *Broad-Bottom Alliance* into Execution.

The Account the *Apologiſt* gives of the Terms upon which the noble Perſon he defends came into Power, are very extraordinary; and

and if he had them not from *indiſputable* Authority, it was certainly a very raſh Thing to publiſh them; he might, for any Thing one can ſee, have been very well juſtified in diſliking the Conduct of the War; the natural Conſequence of which was deſiring to ſee an End put to it by a ſafe and ſolid Peace, the only End a wiſe Man and a worthy Patriot could wiſh for. But it is not poſſible to find out the Reaſons which could induce a Man of great Parts, and as his Actions as well as Profeſſions had hitherto ſhewn him a Man of diſintereſted Probity, to aſſiſt, or even connive at an Impoſition on his —— by Pretences of Zeal for carrying on the War, when in Reality no ſuch Thing was intended. It is ſtill more ſtrange, and more unaccountable, to hear it pretended, that to facilitate this Scheme, he undertook an Em——y to *H—d* with Letters Credentials ſo directly oppoſite to thoſe Intentions, in which he was immovably fixed. The Author of the *Reſignation diſcuſſed* treats this Matter very ſoftly, and juſt hints at a *Memorial*, which, he ſays, proves that noble Perſon had quite a different Opinion of the *D—h*, from what he is reported to have had by his *Apologiſt*: This Affair is now become ſo very ſerious, and the People of *G——t-B——n* ſeem ſo

univerſally diſpoſed to ſee all theſe *Farces* of *State* examined to the bottom, and to know the *true* Characters and *real* Views, of thoſe who in this critical Conjuncture have the *Management* of their *Affairs*; that I cannot diſpenſe with the bare mention of this Memorial, but muſt take the Liberty of quoting two Paſſages from it. Paſſages which, when compared with the *Apology*, will make that appear a very ſtrange thing; or this a very ſtrange *Memorial.*

The firſt is with Regard to the Sameneſs of his M——y's Notions, and thoſe of the *D—h*, for the Truth of which he makes himſelf reſponſible to the —— his M——r, the Republick, and the *Britiſh* Nation. Theſe are his Words: " The cloſe Union " of the two Nations is neither the Effect " of ſome tranſient Views, nor the Fruit " of accidental Conjunctures; but a right " Conſequence of our reciprocal and inva- " riable Intereſts. Nature pointed it out " to us, in placing us, as ſhe has done, and " the uninterrupted Experience of almoſt " a Century does not permit us to be igno- " rant, that our mutual Proſperity depends " on our Union. This Truth is ſo indiſ- " putable, that we ought to look upon as

" our

" our common Enemies, all thoſe who " preſume to call it in Queſtion. Vicinity " is to moſt Nations nothing elſe but a " fatal Source of Jealouſy and Diſcord; " whereas we have the ſingular Happineſs " of being Neighbours in a Manner fit to " procure us infinite Advantages, without a " Poſſibility of any Diſtruſt or Umbrage " ariſing therefrom, if we do not forget " our grand Intereſts. Such are the King's " Notions; and by what I have obſerved " myſelf, I will dare to aſſure him, that " your High Mightineſſes are in the ſame " way of thinking. Who can be ignorant " of it? Our Allies know it, our Enemies " feel it. *Europe* has already often reaped " the precious Fruits of our Harmony: " What ought it not yet to expect from " it?"

The next Paſſage relates to the Reception that he himſelf met with, to the Senſe he had of it, and to the Obligation he thought himſelf under of making that publickly known to the whole World; the Words of the Memorial are theſe. " As for what " relates to myſelf, High and Mighty Lords, " nothing more pleaſing could happen to " me, than being charged for the ſecond " Time with the King's Orders, near your

" High Mightineſſes, eſpecially in an Oc-
" caſion where the Buſineſs was to concert
" Means to perform the Engagements,
" which I contributed to form ſome Years
" ago. I ſhall never forget the kind Re-
" ception I met with then, and at preſent
" from your High Mightineſſes, and my
" Gratitude will end but with my Days;
" but if your High Mightineſſes will vouch-
" ſafe to remember me, view me, High
" and Mighty Lords, only on the Side of
" my ſincere Zeal for the common Good of
" both Nations, my reſpectful Veneration for
" your Government, and, if I may preſume
" to uſe the Expreſſion, my tender Attach-
" ment to this Republick. Done at the
" *Hague*, *May* 18, 1745."

The next great and publick Tranſaction that occurs in this Diſpute, (for I profeſs not to meddle with little ones) is the *general Reſignation*, by which Name I chuſe to call it, in order to diſtinguiſh it from partial and particular Reſignations. This the *Apologiſt* gives us an Account in ſuch Terms as repreſents it as a publick Meaſure, dictated by private Reſentment, carried on with private Views, and concluded by the Eſtabliſhment of private Advantages. The Author of the *Reſignation diſcuſſed* has retorted this

this very ſtrongly, and to be ſure has very fully proved, that this ſame general Reſignation was a very ſtrict and literal Adherence to the original *Coalition Treaty*. But there is one thing in which both theſe Writers have fallen ſhort, and with reſpect to which, if they had meant the full Satisfaction of the Publick, it became them to have inſiſted moſt. I mean what were the Sentiments expreſſed by this noble Perſon upon that Occaſion. If he treated it in the manner the *Apologiſt* ſeems to hint, this was certainly a Deſertion of the Broad Bottom Treaty; or in other Words, a Deſertion of thoſe Principles upon which this *Apologiſt* founds the *late* Reſignation. On the other Hand, if he did not treat it in this Light, but in the direct contrary, which was broadly inſinuated at the Time of the general Reſignation, it is a very ſingular Proceeding to give *ſuch* a *turn* to it now; and a Proceeding that, however expedient it may be as things ſtand at preſent, by no Means reconcilable to that Candour, Ingenuity, and Frankneſs, with which the Hiſtory of *this Reſignation*, if it was neceſſary to write it at all, ought to have been written. Nor will it much mend the Matter with reſpect to the *Apology*, if this noble Perſon was really ſilent upon that Occaſion;

for

for tho' it muſt be allowed that might not only be a very cautious and prudent, but a very wiſe and well meaning Behaviour at the Time; yet to come at ſuch a diſtance as this, and upon ſo extraordinary and particular an Occaſion, to *explain* the Grounds of it in this manner, is taking ſuch an Advantage as places that *Silence* in quite another Light. In a Light as diſadvantageous, as the Conduct of the noble Perſon, ſuppoſing it ſuch, was at that tickliſh Conjuncture, juſt and circumſpect. In ſhort, it is a Point that ought not to have been *touched upon* on either Side, if it could not have been fully and poſitively *made out*. Reſerve at the Time was both juſtifiable and ſeaſonable, and for that very Reaſon all future Explication became improper, becauſe they ſeem to be called forth by ſome ſubſequent *Turn*, and it may be ſuſpected that they receive ſome Tincture from *that* Turn, which they are *produced* to *ſerve*.

All this will appear yet in a ſtronger and more glaring Light when we come to conſider the next *Reſignation*, which, 'till the *Apologiſt* handled it, was looked upon as a Matter of ſmall Moment, and in that Light it is ſtill placed by his *Antagoniſt*. But if this be a falſe Light, then we ought to con-

ſider *this* Reſignation in the very ſame Point of View in which the *Apologiſt* would place the *laſt Reſignation*; the neceſſary Conſequence of which is, that no natural or juſtifiable Account can be given for the ſubſequent Conduct of *both* the noble Perſons the *Apologiſt* affects ſo much to commend. As to ſlight and perſonal Differences between Miniſters, without doubt the Nation has very little to do with them; but when things come to ſuch a Paſs, that a Miniſter cannot ſerve in a great Office, in a Manner *worthy* of an *Engliſhman*, which muſt be the Caſe when his Reſignation is commended as an Act highly *ſuitable* to that Character; it is equally hard to comprehend how, after the Reſignation of that Office, another very high Poſt ſhould be accepted by the *ſame* Perſon without any Change of Miniſters or Meaſures; or how the Poſt ſo quitted, ſhould be filled by the other noble Perſon with ſuch univerſal Approbation. Theſe are *Secrets* of *State*, that ought either to be covered with *impenetrable Darkneſs*, or whenever they are brought to open *View* ſhould be explained with the utmoſt *Perſpicuity*. The not doing this is calling the People to hear and determine a Cauſe without *Evidence*. It is preferring an *Indictment* without *Witneſſes*; it is *appealing* to the *Public* without

Proof,

Proof, and therefore all that can be expected from the Public in ſuch a Caſe, is to call *loudly* for the *Proofs*, without which it is impoſſible for them to determine any Thing; or at leaſt, any Thing but this, that while the Affairs of the Nation were in the utmoſt Perplexity, when her moſt eſſential Intereſts were at Stake, and her moſt momentous Concerns in the utmoſt Danger, *thoſe* who ought to have been employed in *taking Care of them*, were either diſputing among themſelves about *Trifles*; or if their Diſputes were of *greater Conſequence*, they muſt have aroſe from Cauſes not *proper* for the *public Ear*. How unlike ſuch a Proceeding as this is to give general Satisfaction, to raiſe our Credit either with Friends or Foes Abroad, or to calm the Minds of the People at Home; I need not ſay the Thing ſpeaks itſelf, and is thoroughly *explained* from this *Want* of *Explanation*. I do not mean to *play* upon Words, but to ſhew how improper, how indiſcreet, how indecent it is for Writers to *play* with *Matters* of ſuch Importance, when they have it not in their *Power* to treat them in the *ſerious* Manner they ought to be treated.

Several Points that are next examined and diſputed between theſe two Writers ſeem not to be yet altogether ripe for any clear and

and certain Deciſion. If one can make any Thing of them it amounts to no more than this, that there ſeems to have been a Trial of Skill between two Miniſters in Poſts of the ſame Nature, who ſhould engroſs *the Secret*, and thereby the upper-hand in the Cabinet. This, by extraordinary Application and Addreſs, ſeemed at firſt to lean *one* Way; but in Proceſs of Time, and in Conſequence of a certain Negotiation of Peace, at length leaned the *other* Way; for which the *Perſon* charged with *that* important Negotiation was moſt dreadfully abuſed. I muſt confeſs I can diſcern ſome Intrigue and Management, and a great deal of Heat and Reſentment in theſe Tranſactions, ſuppoſing them to be on both Sides fairly ſtated; but I am very far from being edified with the Conduct of either. Diſputes of ſuch a Nature, and on ſuch Occaſions, can never tend to the *Service* of the *Nation*; nor is it eaſy to perceive any very good Effects that can follow from the Publication of them. One Thing only is clear, that the great End ſought by the Coalition, whatever that End was, became plainly defeated by theſe Diſputes, and by nothing elſe. If, as on one Side is pretended, it was the *giving up* of *the War*, and, at all Events, concluding a ſpeedy *Peace*, it is on the ſame

Side confeſſed, that this was departed from by *all* Parties; for thoſe that were *taken in*, as well as thoſe that *took* them *in*, were *carried away by the Torrent*, and for a Time at leaſt concurred in promoting martial Meaſures. On the other Hand, if, as the other Writer aſſerts, the real View of the Coalition, and the great End of the Broad-bottom Treaty was to carry on an *Engliſh War*; this was either not clearly underſtood by *both* Parties, or if, as the Truth ſeems to be, it was at firſt ſo underſtood and purſued, they ſoon untwiſted again, and croſſed each other's Meaſures. The *Apologiſt* ſays, that thoſe who promoted the War defeated their own Meaſures: This may be true, but it is very improbable, and we have only his Word for it. His *Antagoniſt* ſays, their Meaſures were *croſt* by *thoſe* they *took in* to promote them; this is not only more probable, but, in ſeveral Inſtances, is inadvertently confeſſed by the other Writer: It happens a little unluckily for the Public, that tho' they cannot get entirely into the Secret of *how*, *why*, or *wherefore* they were croſſed, yet they cannot help being truly ſenſible of the Fact, that they *have been croſſed*, and ſince the *Apology* was publiſhed, have had the Mortification of ſeeing a *very large* Sum of public Money granted to diſcharge the

Expence

Expence incurred by making a *Conqueſt*, which in that Pamphlet is repreſented as *not* worth *keeping*, and hardly worth *Thanks* if we give it back. Theſe are melancholy Reflections, but they are ſuch Reflections as, upon reading theſe Pieces, it is impoſſible for a Man to keep out of his Head. How prudent it might be to diſcloſe them to all the World, and to diſcloſe them firſt abroad, for the *Apology* is directed to a Gentleman at the *Hague*, I ſhall not take upon me to determine. But ſince they are diſcloſed, the Publick ſeems to have acquired a Right to a *better Account* of them, which I believe it will not be long before they receive, and that for a *Reaſon* which will be preſently given.

There is in the Apology, amongſt other extraordinary Pieces of News, the following Account of a Tranſaction, in itſelf very remarkable; and made more ſo by the manner in which this Author has dreſſed it up. His Antagoniſt, not without ſome Shew of Reaſon, diſputes his Repreſentation of it: but however, let us firſt ſee what it was, and then perhaps we ſhall find ſome other Relation, of as good or perhaps better Credit, with which it may be compared; and then we

ſhall be able to gueſs at its Authenticity, and of the Regard that ought to be paid to it. The Account then of this martial Atchievement runs thus. " It is known to all *Eu-*
" *rope*, that General *Ligonier* was made a
" Priſoner at *La Valle*; but not ſo univer-
" ſally how much Honour he acquired in
" Exchange for his Liberty. It has been
" ſaid, that he owed his Misfortune to his
" Raſhneſs: And it muſt be owned, that a
" Man, who with but thirty Squadrons
" ventures to charge one hundred and fifty,
" does at firſt Sight ſeem liable to ſuch an
" Imputation. But the Characters of Acti-
" ons cannot be fairly given, unleſs a due
" Regard be ſhewn to the Circumſtances
" which attend them. Now the whole
" Body of Infantry, under the Command
" of His R—— H—— the D——, were
" expoſed to the Fury of theſe hundred
" and fifty Squadrons, and nothing but the
" deſperate Attack in Queſtion could have
" ſaved them from being cut to Pieces, or
" ſecured the Perſon of his R—— H——,
" or preſerved *Maeſtricht*, which had other-
" wiſe fallen into the Hands of the Ene-
" my the ſame Evening. Whereas they
" were ſo ſurprized and ſo diſordered by
" the Diverſion which the General had

" thus

" thus gallantly and ſeaſonably made, that " his R—— H—— had ſufficient time to " recover *Maeſtricht*, and to poſt his Troops " in Safety, on the other Side of the *Meuſe*."

We had an Account of this Battle publiſhed in the *Gazette*, dated *Whitehall*, *June* the 27th, 1747, and ſaid to be directed by his R—— H—— the D—— to a *certain noble Perſon* then S———y of S——. Let us ſee how far it agrees, or can be made agree with the Apologiſt's Story.

" In the Morning, ſays this Account, " about Break of Day (*June* the 21ſt, " 1747) the Enemy made ſeveral Counter- " marches over againſt us, and at nine in " the Morning we judged that they had " no farther Deſign to attack us that Day; " when ſoon after, Sir *John Ligonier* ſent " Lieutenant Colonel *Forbes* to acquaint his " R— H— that he imagined the Enemy " was juſt going to attack us, or to endea- " vour to out flank us and cut us off from " *Maeſtricht*. Upon which his R—— H—— " went immediately to the Left, and de- " ſired the Marſhal to put the Right in- " ſtantly under Arms. About an Hour " after that his R—— H—— was arrived " there,

" there, and had made his Diſpoſitions, and
" placed his Batteries, the Enemy appeared
" formed in a deep Column, twelve Batta-
" lions a-breaſt, in order to attack a ſmall
" Encloſure, with about four or five ſmall
" Houſes in it, where we had four Battalions
" poſted; and about that Village alone almoſt
" the whole of the Action was, which laſt-
" ed about four Hours, after it had been
" taken and retaken four times; and when
" we had made ourſelves Maſters of it, by
" the Aſſiſtance of our own detached Troops,
" which came to us from the Right, the
" Line of Foot without the Village began
" to give way a little; they were however
" again put in Order. His R—— H——
" then went to form that Part of the Ca-
" valry which had been in Diſorder, but
" found himſelf cut off by ſome Squadrons
" of *French* Cavalry which had broke in,
" and was obliged to retire to our Cavalry,
" who by that time had charged and broke
" the Enemies firſt Line; and afterwards,
" while his R—— H—— was with them,
" charged a ſecond time, and broke the E-
" nemy again; but purſuing them too far,
" received a Fire from ſome Foot who lay
" behind the Hedges, which gave the *French*
" Cavalry time to form again, and then

" they forced ours to retire. In the mean " time our Infantry retreated towards *Ma-* " *eſtricht*, to the Place where we joined. " His R—— H—— marched towards *Lu-* " *nakin* with all the Cavalry, to favour the " Retreat of the *Dutch* and the Right " Wing, which was effected ſo ſucceſsful- " ly, that they loſt nothing but ſome few " Men by Cannon Shot. Sir *John Ligo-* " *nier* and Count *Iſenbourg* had the Misfor- " tune to be taken in the laſt Attack that " our Horſe made."

I ſhall not trouble the Reader with any Remarks upon theſe Accounts, he has them before him, and may decide for himſelf, whether they are conſiſtent or not; and if the World ſhould agree in thinking them inconſiſtent, there is no Doubt to be made, that where ſuch great Names have been ſo freely mentioned, the Matter will be cleared up, and ſo no Doubt will the Affair of the Meſſage. But I muſt however freely confeſs, that declaring Peace at the Head of the Armies, upon Terms which, however moderate, were plainly preſcribed by *France*, might very eaſily ſhock *Britiſh* Miniſters, who have any Delicacy, any Concern, for the Reputation of their Country, any Remembrance of

of her former Glory, and how unuſual a thing it has been for her to *ſubmit* to *Peace* upon ſuch Terms. I know very well, that the Peace of *Ryſwick* has been mentioned as a Precedent upon this Occaſion; it was a Peace offered by *France*, it was a Peace negotiated if not concluded in the *Field*. But then there are *two* things to be conſidered, the *firſt* is, that in the Peace of *Ryſwick* infinitely better Terms were granted to the Allies; granted, did I ſay? no, they were inſiſted upon, and *Lewis* XIV. thought fit to acquieſce: ſo that there the *French* did not *preſcribe*, but *accept* a Peace. In the *next* Place, that very Peace was made with a deep Deſign, upon which followed the two *Partition* Treaties, which at the long run threw the Kingdom of *Spain* into the Hands of the *Houſe* of *Bourbon*. If therefore the Treaty of *Ryſwick* ought to be conſidered as a Precedent, it may be juſtly doubted, whether it is a Precedent we ſhould incline to follow. But if this after all comes out to be the Caſe, we may do it at any time; for *France* will never be backward in making Propoſitions of the ſame Nature. She knows her own Intereſt *too well* to be negligent in that Point; and if we are at any time ſo very ſick of the War, as to be glad to catch at

at ſuch a kind of Peace, we may be pretty confident that ſhe will let it hang in our *Reach*; for to get us once more under her Influence, by reeſtabliſhing an Opinion of her Moderation, ſeems to be, of all others, the thing ſhe affects *moſt*; and with good Reaſon; for while we remain captivated by ſuch an Opinion, ſhe has all things to hope, and nothing to fear. Her Ambition may then have full Scope, and while ſhe is gratifying it by her *Intrigues*, ſhe may be reſtoring her ſhattered *Marine*, and encouraging that *Commerce*, which by this War, as *weary* as we are of it, we have almoſt *deſtroyed*, with no ſmall Advantage to our own. But how this Advantage will be *ſecured* by the making *ſuch* a *Peace*, I hope Experience will never teach us.

As to the ſubſequent Propoſal from *Spain*, it has been *produced* on one ſide, and very *politically* diſcuſſed on the other: only one thing I beg leave to add, which is this, that the Completion of ſuch a Peace would have been in the very Teeth of thoſe Rules

ſo unanimouſly laid down in Parliament. For if the preſent War, and I think we are ſtill at War with *Spain*, was *neceſſary*, it muſt continue *ſo*, till the *Ends* that *made* it *neceſſary* are *gained*. If *Gibraltar* and *Port Mahon* are real Securities for our Trade and Navigation in the *Mediterranean*, we can never bear the moſt *diſtant Hint* of purchaſing a Peace by giving either of them *up*. If no real Security can be had for our Trade and Navigation in *America*, but by obtaining ſuch *cautionary Places* there, ſome Mention of a thing of this Sort ought to have *attended* thoſe *Propoſals*, or it might have been dangerous for Miniſters to meddle with them. There are many things to be conſidered in *Peace-making*, and though this be the undoubted Prerogative of the Crown, yet the Conſequences of the *Treaty* of *Utrecht* ſhew us, that Miniſters are accountable, when they take upon themſelves to make *uſe* of that *Authority*; and the Cenſures ſo near paſſing upon a *late* Miniſter, not for *Peace-making* but for *Peace-keeping*, will, or at leaſt ought to be a *Memento* to his Succeſſors.

fors. But it is now time to draw to a Concluſion, for Diſſertations upon publick Affairs, which neither point out any *End*, or recommend any *Means*, are mere political *Cobwebs*, which hang upon the Walls, not only without Uſe, but with ſuch a degree of Diſgrace, as very well deſerves that they ſhould be *ſwept down*. To prevent a Fate therefore ſo diſagreeable, not to the Vanity only, but to the rational and juſt Pride of an Author, I ſhall ſum up all with a very few Reflections, that ſeem to me to ariſe from the Subject I have been handling, and that Impartiality with which I hope I have handled it.

We have ſeen from a clear Deduction of *Facts*, that hitherto we have only rung the *Changes* upon different *Syſtems* to very little Purpoſe. If we could have been contented with the *pacifick* Scheme, it is not eaſy to ſay why we were ſo much bent upon *getting rid* of it; and the old Miniſter ſaid truly, as well as wiſely, *that if his* Removal *only was to be purchaſed by a* War, *the Na-*

tion had a very dear Bargain. Yet this ſeems to be the Bargain that ſome People were very early inclined to drive, if it be true, that the fundamental Article of the *Coalition* Treaty was the making Peace again as ſoon as might be. Indeed there is this to be ſaid for that State of the Caſe, that a very conſiderable Part of our wiſe and ſteady *Patriots* continued to *oppoſe* the *War*, when it was vigorouſly and not unſucceſsfully made; I mean immediately after the Battle of *Dettingen*, with the ſame *Zeal* and *Spirit* which they had exerted to *drive* us *into it*. But to drive a Nation into a War, and then drive her out again before the *Ends* for which *themſelves* declared the War to be *neceſſary* were attained, or like to be attained, is a Scheme of Policy ſo refined, as to ſtand much above the reach of *common Senſe*. But it may be urged, that after all the pacifick Syſtem appears by Experience to be the eaſieſt managed, and the moſt laſting. The Queſtion is, whether it will be always ſo, or whether it be likely that the Miniſters who reſtore that Syſtem, will

will be able to maintain themſelves in Power as long as he did, that had the Management of that Syſtem in better Times, when Affairs abroad were leſs perplexed, and when our Domeſtick Concerns were in a much better Condition. Nay granting even this to be poſſible, can we ſuppoſe it will ever be agreeable to *this Nation*, to ſee the very *ſame Men* eſtabliſhing themſelves in *Power* by the *revival* of that *Syſtem*, which with ſo much Heat and Violence they laboured to deſtroy, which they accompliſhed at ſuch a prodigious *Expence* of *Blood* and *Treaſure*, and which might have been much cheaper *preſerved*, by adding *Convention* to *Convention*, and preferring *Spithead* to *Mediterranean* Expeditions? This is a Point which, how *little* ſoever they may think of it, will, if ever they venture to make a *Peace*, employ the *Thoughts* of many of their *fellow Subjects*, in a Manner perhaps not much to their Advantage.

The other and oppoſite Syſtem, of a *vigorous War*, is ſaid to have been found impracticable.

practicable. This ought however to have been conſidered before it was undertaken; for tho', it muſt be allowed, that it was conſtantly oppoſed from the Time it was undertaken, yet nobody can deny that it was in expreſs Terms recommended by the Paragraph heretofore cited, from a famous Proteſt ſubſcribed by the *very Perſons* that ſo early oppoſed it, and now would paſs that early Oppoſition upon us as a Mark of Conſiſtency with their preſent Principles. But let them ſay what they will, they muſt deliver themſelves from this *Dilemma*, before they can re-inſtate themſelves in their *old* Character of *Patriots*. If a vigorous War in ſupport of the Balance of Power, and the Weight of the Houſe of *Auſtria* was not a right Meaſure, why did they *recommend* it, or inſiſt on the Condemnation of a Miniſter for purſuing, as they aſſerted, a contrary Conduct? If it was a right Meaſure, why did they ſo ſoon *oppoſe*, and by the Warmth of their Oppoſition defeat it? The Meaſures taken for the Execution of that Syſtem, tho' they are now ſtiled *wild*

and

and *drunken*, were once thought great and glorious, not only by us, but by all our Allies, and even by our Enemies. It may be worth while to prove this. The Empreſs Queen of *Hungary* concurred in them, and it is very well known expreſſed great Concern, when ſhe ſaw this Syſtem on the Point of changing. The Steadineſs of the King of *Sardinia* was owing to them, for the Concluſion of the *Treaty* of *Worms* fixed him to our Side, and determined him to reject all the Overtures that were made him. The *French* affirm, that the *Dutch* came fully into theſe Meaſures; this is the *crying Sin* with which they charge them, and for committing which *Saxe* and *Lowendhal* have been ſent to chaſtiſe them. It was by theſe Meaſures, and theſe only, that *France* was terrified, as ſhe confeſſes herſelf in that Reply to the Anſwer of the States General to her Memorials, which has been before cited. But if after all this Scheme was *impracticable*, it was our Misfortune that it was not foreſeen before it was attempted, before we ſpent ſo much Money in endea-

vouring its Execution, and before we entered into Treaties from the Engagements contracted, by which we ſtill remain undiſcharged, unleſs we can be diſcharged by calling them *wild* and *drunken* Engagements; which is certainly a new Way of getting rid of Alliances, reſerved for the *Politicians* of our Times, and hid from the Eyes even of *Machiavel* himſelf, tho' I cannot tell whether they may not be deduced from the political Principles of *Hobbes*.

We have however tried what a *middle Way* would do, and between the *Apologiſt* and his *Antagoniſt*, there has been more ſaid in Favour of it than I believe any Body imagined poſſible; and if no other Good has been derived from it, it looks like the more honourable Way to Peace. The Remainder of the *old* Miniſtry, who had been forced into a War, acted conſiſtently enough in recurring to this *middle Way*, when they found the other rendered impracticable, not more by the *Superiority* of the *Enemy* Abroad, than by the *Weight* of a *powerful Oppoſition*

Oppoſition at Home. A Weight that hung ſo heavy upon their Meaſures, that it was no Wonder they moved ſlow. A Weight that made it abſolutely neceſſary for them to make uſe of an untoward Expedient to rid themſelves in Appearance of the *H—n—r* Troops, upon which the Loſs of the Battle of *Fontenoy* hath been charged, and that again objected to them as a Crime. According to the ſame Logic, the Loſs of the Battle of *Raucoux* has been placed to their Account, together with that of *Valle*; the Loſs of *Bergen-op-zoom*, and, no Doubt, *Maeſtricht* will make another *Item*. But the *Apologiſt*, in making theſe Charges, opened a Way for their Defence, of which the Public is in Poſſeſſion, and will judge whether they have done *all* that they *could do* or not.

The winding up of the Bottom is this: That hitherto every Syſtem has failed us from one and the ſame Cauſe, the *Want* of *Unanimity*; and if all our Loſſes, all our Diſappointments, all our Diſputes would

but terminate in reſtoring *Unanimity*, I dare prophecy, that if, after mature Deliberation, we made Choice of *any* Syſtem, we might be able to extricate ourſelves from the Difficulties we are under with *Reputation*, and ſupport the Meaſures we thought fit to take with *Dignity* and *Honour*. But while we remain an uneaſy, fickle, factious, reſtleſs and divided People, it is impoſſible that we ſhould do any Thing that is great, either in the *Field* or in the *Cabinet*. Let us then, at laſt, reſolve upon what ought to have been our Choice at firſt; let us forget the *Faults* of ſome, and overlook the *Overſights* of others, for the ſake of ALL. This is the only Method that is left, and if not practiſed very ſoon, we have no Security that even this will long be *left us*. We have yet vaſt *Reſources*, if we do not *waſte* them by our *Folly*, or *doubt* of them from *Deſpair*: We can never employ them better than at this *critical Juncture*, when every Thing is at Stake. At all Times UNION is requiſite and laudable, at preſent it is *abſolutely neceſſary*; if we *unite* we may be *ſafe*; but

if we protract, delay, and continue to *quarrel* amongſt *ourſelves*, we muſt be *undone*, become the Prey of our *Enemies*, and the Deriſion of thoſe who once thought it their higheſt Honour to be ſtiled our *Friends*. AVERT IT HEAVEN!

FINIS.